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ANDREW PAYNE
"God writes straight with crooked lines."
Proverbial
From Mishaps to Miracles
Errata reveal that interval, decisive as it is infinitesimal, in which our acts, at the
very moment of being actualized, part company with our intentions. They register
the lapses in our ego-driven attention to the world, marking the syncopation of
conscious and unconscious experience thanks to which chance gets a chance. But
who or what gives what chance gets? And how do the mortal agents of these acts
receive this aleatory largesse, as blessing or as curse? Producing a kind of detour
or deviation at the origin, these last two questions lead away from a theory of errata,
of mishaps and mistakes, and toward a theory of the miracle.
Like our mishaps, miracles rend the fabric of familiar experience. But in the
case of the miracle this rending owes to an event that was not merely unforeseen,
but unforeseeable, since the necessity to which it corresponds is of a different
order than those that produce reliability in our world, and which are therefore the
proper objects of human foresight. Here foresight does not fail; it encounters a
superior jurisdiction. What is perhaps remarkable is that this encounter, so traumatic
to the ego's self-assurance, should be thought to have soteriological implications.
In his posthumously published Der Spei8el interview of 1966, the German philosopher
Martin Heidegger remarked that "only a God could save us now." He might have
added "from ourselves." For if, as the saying goes, God's revenge is to give us what
we think we want, His mercy may be thought to consist in saving us from what we
imagine to be our bliss, in standing between us and the life-petrifying powers of a
Midas touch. This idea of a providential agency that saves us from ourselves is
the essence of comedy, where the schemes and plots that would actualize our
ego-driven agendas are consistently undone to redemptive effect.
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Makin'Time: Vorlust and the Miracle
I have suggested that the miracle implies a detournement of the ego's expectations,
if not precisely of its desire, one whose effect is to retract the veil of complacency
that habit drapes over our relations with the world. In the interest of illuminating
the temporality peculiar to this effect, let me advance a comparison that may
appear, on its face, an unlikely one, a comparison of that eclipse of the ego's aims
we have just identified with the time of the miracle and the frustration of those
same aims implicit in the psychoanalytic concept of Vorlust, a term that strictly
speaking means foreplay but that in the writings of ]acques Lacan becomes associated
with the full gamut of instinctual renunciations covered by the term sublimation.
At stake in this comparison would be the difference between the time of our projects
(in which, according to the psychoanalytic theory of the unconscious, our merely
instrumental aims are complicated by a desire that confuses our wishes with those
of an intrapsychic Other) and a time that suspends the project, a time in which the
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trajectory from intention to act is not merely diverted, but entirely set aside. In
the spirit of deviation or delay that the first term in this pairing implies, I will
linger rather patiently with the psychoanalytic theory of Vorlust before cashing out
its unforseen implications for our major theme, the time of the miracle.
It is Freud who in his Three Essays on Sexuality first poses the question of foreplay
[Vorlust] as a technique by which the subject 'times' its relationship to pleasure by
placing the satisfaction that is pleasure's goal at a near distance. In the context of
a discussion of the deviations to which the sexual aim is susceptible, he remarks:
"The normal sexual aim is regarded as being the union of the genitals in the act
known as copulation, which leads to a release of the sexual tension and a tempo-
rary extinction of the sexual instinct-a satisfaction analogous to the sating of
hunger. But ... there are certain intermediate relations to the sexual object, such
as touching and looking at it, which lie on the roads towards copulation and are
recognized as being preliminary sexual aims. On the one hand those activities are
themselves accompanied by pleasure, on the other hand they intensify the excitation,
which should persist until the definite sexual aim is attained."! Freud's concern, in
this passage at least, is with the relationship between the pleasures arising from
deferral of the sexual aim and those "perversions" that result when a subject's
unconscious history leaves it disinclined to pursue these aims with a vigor favouring
the species interest. Excepting such pathological instances, the time of Vorlust is for
Freud a brief interlude on the way to coitus, an interlude dominated less by the
mood of frustration than by what we can only imagine as delicious anticipation of
a familiar pleasure.
It is Freud's heterodoxical disciple, Jacques Lacan, who first underlines the
element of frustration implicit in these voluptuous preliminaries-that element
so suggestive for our own consideration of the time of the miracle. In a chapter of
his The Ethics if Psychoanalysis entitled "Courtly Love as Anamorphosis," he
remarks: "It is only insofar as the pleasure of desiring, or, more precisely, the
pleasure of experiencing unpleasure, is sustained that we can speak of the sexual
valorization of the preliminary stages of the act of love."2 So central is this element
of unpleasure to the economization of desire characteristic of Vorlust that it compels
Lacan to affirm that "the paradox ... of foreplay is precisely that it persists in
opposition to the purposes of the pleasure principle."This sublime admixture of
pleasure and frustration is a condition for what Lacan then refers to as "the ethical
function of eroticism."3 This function would consist in introducing the possibility
that the second order pleasure resulting from employment of these techniques of
self-denial might represent not merely a deferral of the sexual aims (insofar as they
work in conformity with the ends of the pleasure principle) but their replacement
by another order of satisfaction altogether, one that concerns the return, at a distance,
of something Lacan calls jouissance.
By jouissance we may take Lacan to mean that self-annihilating ecstasis of which
Giordano Bruno spoke when, in his Heroic Frenzies, he remarked: "Acteons are very
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rare who have the good luck to look upon Diana naked, to fall so much in love ...
that they are changed from hunters into game. For the final goal of this science of
hunting is to come upon the rare and wild beast who transforms the hunter into
the object of his hunt."4 In fact, without ever mentioning Bruno, Lacan echoes the
Nolan's illeist gloss on Ovid's myth in the seminar immediately preceding the
Ethics, his sixth. In the context of a discussion in which Shakespeare's Hamlet is
described as the "very image" of an unconscious law according to which the sub-
ject is "merely the reverse side of a message that is not even its own," he remarks:
"The final act, in which Hamlet puts the full weight of his life on the line, as the
price of being able to accomplish his action~this act that he activates and
undergoes, has something in it of the moment at the end of the hunt when everyone
moves in for the kill. At the moment when his act reaches completion, he is also
the deer brought to bay by Diana."s In order to understand what is at stake in
Lacan's version of this amorJati, we need to appreciate that for him before anything
else the term jouissance indicates the state of oceanic bliss obtaining between infant
and Mother prior to the former's insertion in an imaginary/symbolic matrix, a
state that then becomes, on the other side of that insertion, the impossible object
of unconscious fantasy. For Lacan the fatal dimension in this arrangement consists
in the fact that, were jouissance, on the other side of the subject's imaginary/ symbolic
incorporation, ever to slip from the order of unconscious fantasy into the order of
lived reality, the result would prove no less lethal than in the deadly game
described by Bruno. For the primitive encounter with the Other that jouissance
implies involves nothing less than the dissolution of the subject's capacity for auto-
affection, such capacity having been swallowed, ]onah like, by the desire of the
(M)Other. Lacan uses the phrase "desire of the Mother" [desir de la mere] in an
almost neologistic sense, allowing the ambivalence of the genitive to suggest the
transgression of the boundary separating infant and mother. In his seventeenth
seminar, L envers de la psychoanalyse, he stresses the cannibalistic implications of this
trangression. As he puts it: "Her [the mother's] desire is not something you can
bear easily, as if it were a matter of indifference to you. It also leads to problems.
The mother is a big crocodile, and you find yourself in her mouth. You never know
what may set her off suddenly, making those jaws clamp down. That is the
mother's desire."6
If this were not bad enough, the catastrophe that jouissance portends has a
dialectical obverse, for should something of this slippage fail to occur, that is,
should the infant succeed entirely in eluding the "clamping jaws" of the mother's
jouissance, then the subject that this infant must come to be will find itself con-
demned to a life bereft of that relation to others we call love. Our dealings with
jouissance therefore imply a kind of Sophie's Choice: our being~whichis always,
for Lacan, the being of the jouissance that is our primitive link to the (M)Other~
or our meaning. It is in response to this false choice that sublimation, with that
admixture of pleasure and frustration it implies, acquires both its efficacy and
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interest. For, according to Lacan, sublimation affords the subject means by which
to at once enjoy its unconscious Thing and to survive that enjoyment-albeit on
this condition: that it only ever enjoy the Thing as lost. Let us look a little more
closely at how all this works, so as then to shed light on its implications for any
thinking of the time of the miracle.
In the section of "Courtly Love as Anamorphosis" immediately following the
one in which he invokes Vorlust as the primitive schema for sublimation, Lacan goes
on to suggest that this basic schema finds a more culturally complex expression in
the products of artists and poets. The psychic motivations generative of these
products are, according to Lacan, at play long before the distinction between egoic
and erotic aims has become a meaningful one. He then offers as illustrations of the
illeistic "work" at stake in such sublimation both the development of anamorphic
technique in early modern painting and the literary and social codes that emerge
with the poetry of the troubars and their Minnesanaer and Stilnovist successors.
Even judged by Lacanian standards, the discussion of anamorphosis is both
cryptic and tendentious.? I will not engage its various enigmas here. Suffice it for
our purposes to note that anamorphic technique represents for Lacan the operation
of a certain mirror function, albeit one distinct from the function described in his
lecture on "The Mirror Stage as Formative of the Function of the I" (1949), where
the mirror serves as support for imaginary meconnaisance. Says Lacan: "The mirror
may on occasion imply the mechanisms of narcissism, and especially the dimunition
of destruction or aggression that we will encounter subsequently. But it also fulfils
another role, that of limit. It is that which cannot be crossed. And the only
organization in which it can be thought to participate is that of the inaccessibility
of the object."g
Lacan goes on to associate two motifs from the literature of courtly love with
this "limit" that insures "the inaccessibility of the object." The first is that of the
lauzenaier, the jealous rival who is among the narrative devices that serve to delay
the hero's access to his amorous goal. The second motif, which Lacan gleans from
the poetry of Guillaume de Poitiers, is that of the Senhal or secret name shared
between amorous intimates. It too is linked to an effect of frustration or delay,
albeit in a more complicated way, since the sufferer submits voluntarily to the
ascetic regimen that the sharing of this name implies. As Lacan explains, the bearer
of this secret name assumes the status of an intermediary who by turns permits
and bars access to the object of the lover's desire, so that "an artificial and cunning
organization of the signifier ... lays down ... the meaning we must attribute to the
negotiation of the detour in the psychic economy."9 This "meaning," which is none
other than the meaning of sublimation itself, concerns not merely the "commerce"
between pleasure and reality principles, but more crucially the isolation of the
Dina that is the impossible object of jouissance, a Thing whose genesis first Freud
and then Lacan associate with the problem of the Nebenmensch or neighbour:
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V/hat is for us much more important than the reference to the neighbour, who is sup-
posedly the Lady whom Guillaume de Poitiers occasionally played naughty games with,
is the relationship between the expression just referred to and the one that Freud uses in
connection with the first establishment of the Thing, with its psychological genesis,
namely the Nebenmensch. And he designated thereby the very place that from the point of
view of the development of Christianity, was to be occupied by the apotheosis of the
neighbour. 10
It is in the context of describing these two tropes of courtly love, lauzenaier and
sennal, that Lacan first invokes the Freudian theory of Vorlust, remarking that: "The
techniques involved in courtly love ... are techniques of holding back, of suspension,
of amor interruptus. "11 As we have observed, it is by means of this "valorization of
the preliminary stages of the act of love" that the subject learns to enjoy its frus-
tration, making of it the paradoxical object of its aim. This lesson then comes to
provide the basis for the whole spectrum of cultural undertakings (art, religion,
politics) that psychoanalysis associates with the term sublimation. Having said
that, Freud and Lacan theorize this second order enjoyment in quite distinct ways.
In order to see how Lacan transforms the orthodox Freudian view concerning
sublimation, it is important to appreciate the difference between his own inter-
pretation of frustration (Versaauna) and Freud's.
Freud uses the term Versaauna in his "Types of Onset of Neurosis" (1912),
where it is described as the most general precondition of neurosis. In Freud's case,
this frustration is thought to find its typical cause in merely external factors:
The most obvious, the most easily discoverable and the most intelligible precipitating
cause of an onset of neurosis is to be seen in the external factor which may be described
in general terms as frustration [Vel'SQaung]. The subject was healthy so long as his need for
love was satisfied by a real object in the external world; he becomes neurotic as soon as
this object is withdrawn from him without a substitute taking its place. 12
Lacan, on the other hand, drawing on the etymology of the term, links it to a
"refusal" that results not from the lack of a real object, but rather from the relationship
that the subject assumes with itself as a subject of desire. Something about the
desire of the subject, which is its dependency on the signifier, constrains it to
reject or refuse itself: "It is apparent that this Versaauna, which is untranslatable, is
possible only in the sense of a saaen, understood not simply as an act of communi-
cation but as the emergence as such of the signifier insofar as it allows the subject
to refuse itself."13
This refusal corresponds to the Sophie's Choice described above. Either the
subject must refuse the passage of its being into the order of significance-at the
expense of its sanity-or it must accept that passage-at the expense of its
enjoyment. The first instance, which corresponds to the Lacanian understanding
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of psychosis, consists in a refusal of the self-refusal at stake in VersQ8un8, a rejection
of the Father's Phallic Word as an acceptable substitute for the Desire of the
Mother. The second instance, which corresponds to the Lacanian understanding of
neurosis, consists in accepting, however partially or imperfectly, the Phallic
substitute, and thereby refusing or betraying the self whose earliest desire is not
for the Phallus but for the desire of the Mother. With some qualifications, we
could perhaps articulate this opposition in the terms favoured by Hegel in his
"Introduction" to the Phenomenolo8Y ifSpirit (an articulation Lacan indeed seems to
invite in certain of his writings ): the first instance corresponds to that of the
Master who does not defer enjoyment in symbolic labour but who, risking death,
immediately enjoys; the second corresponds to that of the bondsman who, at once
averting the risk of death and eschewing the promise of immediate enjoyment,
goes to work on behalf of the Master. 14
The frustration at stake in sublimation conforms to neither of these alterna-
tives. The artist, the poet, the refined lover-none of these types can be said to
betray its enjoyment through the choice of a substitute object. Nor can they be
thought to betray their desire through a refusal of this substitute. Rather, they are
distinguished by a practice that obliterates the distinction between desire and
enjoyment, frustration and fulfillment, real thing and symbolic substitute, the
point of such a practice being to insure that the subject will be "deprived of some-
thing real." As Giorgio Agamben, drawing obvious inspiration from Lacan's dis-
cussion of courtly love, remarks:
. .. a discourse that is aware that to hold "tenaciously to what is dead exacts the greatest
effort" and that eschews "the magic power that transforms the negative into being" must
necessarily guarantee the unappropriability of its object. This discourse behaves with
respect to its object neither as the master who simply negates it in the act of enjoyment
nor like the slave who works with it and transforms it in the deferral of desire: its
operation is, rather, that of a refined love, a love that at once enjoys and defers, negates
and affirms, accepts and repels; and whose reality is the unreality of the word "qu'amas
l'aura/e chatz la lebre ab la bau/e nadi contra suberna" [that heaps up the breeze/and hunts
the hare and ox/ and swims against the tide].lS
This middle way that sublimation charts between psychosis and neurosis, has for
Lacan a fundamental bearing on the question of whether there can or cannot be
an ethics of psychoanalysis. For, madness aside, sublimation is the only means by
which the subject can communicate with the impossible Thing of its desire, fealty
to this Thing being the sole imperative in Lacan's psychoanalytic ethics. 16
On the basis of the above discussion, Lacan's contribution to the psychoanalytic
theory of Vorlust may be thought to be twofold. First, he reveals that an element of
frustration vitiates the pleasure that Freud associates with Vorlust. Second, he reads
the subject's capacity to actively sublimate this frustration, transforming it into a
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second order pleasure, as testament to both an ability and a need on the part of
desiring subjects to keep faith, via the intercession of some artificial contrivance,
with an order of experience more primitive than the experience of self-affection,
an order encapsulated in Arthur Rimbaud's gnomic assertion that I is another. 17
From this follows both Lacan's insistence that the origin of these sublimatory acts
lies in a region anterior to the ego aims and his insistence on their refractory
relation to the demands of the pleasure principle.
Now according to a paradox that arguably describes the very law of genius,
with its attendant eureka effects, this fealty to pre-egoic experience associated
with the sublimations oflove and art implies a derailment of our capacity to trans-
late intentions into acts, a derailment for which poet and lover must, herein lies
the paradox, make methodical provisions. The spirit of this method is captured in
Picasso's quip, quoted by the artist's family doctor, none other than Lacan, to the
effect that the artist does not seek, he finds-but the epiphanic implications of this
finding are perhaps more vividly conveyed by the contemporary theologian
]ean-Luc Marion when he remarks:
Like Christ, the painter ... gives himself without ever knowing if he will lose himself or
be saved .... The whole mastery consists in ultimately letting the unseen event burst into
the visible by surprise, unpredictably. The instant when the unseen appears ... coincides
precisely with its complete emancipation from its guardian, its coach, its smuggler-the
painter. If the painting were to remain obedient to its painter ... it would immediately
lose its glory as the one miraculously saved from the unseen. IS
It is apparently at the margins of self-possession, in a region where the stable
lineaments of both our motor coordinated corporeal imago and our reflective
mastery over our thoughts and fantasies begin to tremble-it is apparently in just
that zone of mystical indetermination that we encounter the Thing that both the
refined lover's caress and the painter's gesture pursue.
It is interesting in this light to observe that while Lacan's near contemporary,
the phenomenological philosopher Emmanuel Levinas, does not speak of Vorlust,
he does describe the amorous caress, and when he does so he situates it in that
same infantile domain of anonymous experience as Lacan situates his jouissance.
Says Levinas:
The carress aims neither at a person or a thing. It loses itself in a being that dissipates as
though into an impersonal dream without will and even without resistance, a passivity,
an already animal or infantile anonymity, already entirely at death ... The tender desig-
nates a way, the way of remaining in the no-man's between being and not-yet-being. A
way that does not even signal itself as a signification, that in no way shines forth, that is
extinguished and swoons, essential frailty of the beloved produced as vulnerable and as
mortal. 19
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Notwithstanding their common reference to an experience earlier than that of
auto-affection, however, the stratagems of Lacan's amorous "player" ought not to
be confused with that self-annihilating tenderness Levinas associates with the
lover's caress. This difference may serve, moreover, as a synecdoche of the larger
differences separating Lacan's ethics of psychoanalysis from the ethical preoccu-
pations of Levinas. For the thought of the former has, in the end, a pragmatic
thrust. It undertakes to identify those stratagems that the subject has employed
heretofore in its negotiations with the Other and to replace them with new
stratagems capable of transforming unconscious suffering into self-knowledge, if
not invariably happiness. Another way of saying this is to say that in Lacan's ethics
of psychoanalysis the analyst's obsession 'with the Other is checked by art, a healing
art that, by transferring and thereby transforming those identifications which
cause the subject suffering, releases that subject to new affective possibilities. The
wager implicit in every such art is that self-loss, provided that it is not total, may
prove the preliminary to a higher state of self-mastery. That is to say that the sub-
ject surrenders its will to forces whose alterity it thematizes as Other, but with a
confidence that, in conformity with the precepts that determined its initial calcu-
lations, this outlay will be returned with interest. 20 It is precisely this mastery that
the ethical philosophy of Levinas would want to contest, not so as to deny the need
for worldly self-assertion, but rather so as to acknowledge that an experience of
absolute passivity before the Other is both the origin of and condition for such
assertion, an acknowledgement he then sees as an essential preliminary to any
judgment concerning the ethical legitimacy and appropriate limits of our actions.
Hence, for Levinas, if there is to be ethics at all, it must imply a vector of incident
that irreparably pierces that vicious relay in which self-loss and self-mastery per-
form their interminable chiasmus. Enter the time of the miracle. 21
It would seem that, at the end of the day, for Lacan as for Freud, Vorlust offers
a lesson in civics, conferring on us the socially essential knowledge that sublimated
satisfactions, though relatively reliable, take time to prepare, while at the same
time assuring us that the admittedly uncomfortable interim is not without psychic
rewards. The miracle would communicate a much more unruly truth, much more
difficult to operationalize in our practical conduct. For with its appearance we
encounter the radical withdrawal of that cursus naturae solitus on whose credit alone
the ego is able to economize its relationship to enjoyment. But there is more, for
not only does the miracle teach us that the natural or expected course of things is
at every moment subject to suspension, that tomorrow, should God will it, two
plus two may equal turd, not only this, it also teaches that only this radical anni-
hilation of ontological guarantees can give chance a chance and so save us from our
egos, offering us something better than the objects of our pleasure, something at
once soteriological and catastrophic. In the time of the miracle our expectations
and associated desires are not gratified, they are outstripped. We are not sated, we
are bedazzled, and this bedazzlement does violence to our sense of self-assurance.
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The "golden-mouthed" saint, John Chrysostom, fourth-century deacon of the
church at Antioch, alludes to this violence of the epiphanic experience when he
describes "the blow of astonishment" that accompanied his supernatural vision of
God's providential economy [Oikonomia].22 In a similar vein, in Shakespeare's The
Winter's Tale [V. Ill.! 00], Paulina calls on her pseudo-miracle to "Strike all who look
upon with marvel."23
Simultaneously drawing on and laying aside this ego-annihilating force to
which both Chrysostrum and Shakespeare allude, the Vor of Vorlust suggests that
there are adequate preliminaries to the attainment of satisfaction, preliminaries
that may be performed either in the perfunctory manner recommended by Freud,
or with a view to their ever more exquisite attenuation, as in the Gallic mode
advocated by both Guillaume de Poitiers and Jacques Lacan. In either case, it is a
matter of making ready for the arrival of that enjoyment that links us to the Other.
In the case of the miracle, which has its genesis not in my will but the Will of this
Other, there is no making ready but only ever the event of astonished surrender to
what arrives, and with it, exposure to the Other's inscrutable designs on our desire.
Speaking of this exposure, Levinas' friend, Maurice Blanchot, having only just
invoked Simone Weil's claim that "there is no grandeur except in gentleness," goes
on to identify this gentleness with a radical abandonment of art or technique, even
and especially that technique associated with the practice of psychoanalysis.
Macht is the means, the machine, the functioning of the possible. The delirious and desiring
machine tries, in vain, to make dysfunction function. In vain, for un-power is not delirious;
it has always departed from the groove, and is always already derailed; it belongs to the
outside ... The disaster always holds mastery at a distance. I wish (for example) for a
psychoanalyst to whom a sign would come, from the disaster24
"From the disaster," perhaps, but from a disaster whose other face is the miracle.
Here it is worth noting that it is precisely in their recourse to art or technique-
in this case an art of sorcery-that Moses and Aaron betray the miracle that God
had called on them to perform by the waters of Meribah. In the biblical passage in
which this betrayal is recounted (Book if Numbers, chapter 20), we are told that
Moses, having been instructed by God to perform the miracle of drawing water
from a stone by merely verbal means, proceeds to buttress his recitation of the
prescribed verbal formula with the gesture of smiting the stone with his staff, a
gesture apparently intended to convey magical potency. As Eric Santner observes,
Franz Rosenzwieg could be thought to clarify the nature of this betrayal when, in
his Star ifRedemption , he distinguishes between prophecy (which he equates with
genuine attestation of the miracle) and the magical arts. Says Rosenzwieg:
The magician turns on the world in active intervention.... He attacks God's providence and
seeks by audacity, guile, or coercion to extort from it what is unforeseen and unforeseeable
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by it, what is willed by his own will. The prophet, on the other hand, unveils, as he fore-
sees it, what is ",cilled by providence. What would be sorcery in the hands of the magician
becomes portent in the mouth of the prophet. And by pronouncing the portent, the
prophet proves the dominion of providence which the magician denies. He proves it,
for how would it be possible to foresee the future if it were not "provided"? And
therefore it is incumbent to outdo the heathen miracle, to supplant its spell, which
carries out the command of man's own might, with the portent that demonstrates
God's providence. 25
At the beginning of "Courtly Love as Anamorphosis," Lacan calls on the work of
art to "operate its miracle once more," a miracle he places in opposition to the
reigning norms of politics and systematic thought. However, pace Lacan, Levinas,
Blanchot, and Rosenzwieg all give us grounds for resisting any facile association
of the work of art with that un-working peculiar to both the disaster and the
miracle. Such resistance is apparent in Levinas' question concerning whether that
"disinterestedness" Kant identifies as the "ethical condition" of the aesthetic is not
"immediately compromised by the joys of the beautiful, which engross and alienate
the generosity that has made these joys possible."26 Moreover, the wedge that this
question threatens to drive between aesthetic and ethical orders is reinforced by
the distinction, pervasive in Levinas' work, between the figure (as plastic form)
and the Face (as expressive iriforme). As Francois Poirie observes, for Levinas an
ethical violence is implicit in every attempt to "transform faces into objective and
plaStiC forms, into visible but defaced figures."n Levinas' cautions are provocative,
but perhaps they should be leavened with the iconological perspective of another
contemporary French philosopher and theologian, Jean-Luc Marion. Translating
the Levinasian distinction between figure and face into a distinction between idol
and icon, Marion insists on the original and from any human perspective insuperable
imbrication of these apparently antithetical terms. For him, figure and face, idol
and icon represent distinct modalities of a single event in which the invisible
invades the order of the visible. It is from the perspective of this invasion that we
must understand the analogy that Marion, in the passage cited earlier, draws
between the unforeseen event that the authentic act of painting represents and the
parousial event of Christic kenosis.
If the work of art makes possible for Marion that unforeseen event in which
the invisible encroaches on the visible, lifting our gaze from the figure to the Face,
then the miracle, whose paradigm is for Marion the Eucharistic gift of Christic
incarnation, represents the event in which a possibility in excess of what is possible
from the standpoint of"sufficient reason" nevertheless exerts a certain pressure on
the course of ordinate events. On this view, the work of art, with that redemption
of unredeemed experience that it promises, inclines toward the time of the miracle,
without ever entirely coinciding with it. But perhaps we should leave the final
word to an artist, one of the greatest of the century that has just passed. In what
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amounts to a kind of an poetica, Robert Musil describes this eternally imminent
intersection of divine will and human art in the following terms:
One might define the meaning of the possible as the faculty of thinking all that might be
just as much as what is .... The implications of such a creative disposition are huge .... The
possible consists of much more than the dreams of neurasthenics; it also involves the still
dormant plans of God. A possible event or truth is not just the real event of truth minus
the "reality"; rather it signals something very divine, a flame, a burning, a will to con-
struct a utopia which, far from fearing reality, treats it as simply a perpetual task and
invention. The earth is not so spent, after all, and never has it seemed so fascinating28
Here the human "will to construct" opens onto "something very divine, a flame, a
burning"; here our "perpetual task and invention" approaches asymptotically "the
still dormant plans of God"; here art and technique call out to the miracle as the
time of the Other's arrival.
DJMiracles and Modernity
In the same section of The Star cif Redemption quoted above, "On the Possibility of
Experiencing the Miracle," Rosenzwieg observes the barely veiled hostility shown
by modern theology to the concept of the miracle, an hostility that for
Rosenzwieg indicates the extent to which the discipline has been penetrated by an
ethos of secularism:
If miracle really is the favorite child of belief, then its father has been neglecting his paternal
duties for some time. For at least a hundred years the child has been nothing but a source
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of embarrassment for the nurse which he had ordered for it-to theology. She would
gladly be rid of it if only a degree of consideration for the father had not forbidden it
during his lifetime. But time solves all problems. The old man cannot live forever. And
thereupon the nurse will know what she must do with this poor little worm that can
neither live nor die under its own power; she has already made preparations. 29
According to Rosenzwieg the withering of this once majestic theologeme to a
"poor little worm" is in no small part a function of modernity's incapacity to
appreciate the fundamentally semiotic status of the event "miracle" names. As he
puts it: "The miracle is substantially a sign" [Das Wunder ist wesenlin Zeichen].
Modernity's indifference to this semiotic dimension of miraculous intervention is
attested for Rosenzwieg by its fixation on the sense of miracle as natural anomaly,
at the expense of any attention to its reference to a promise first placed in the
mouths of prophets: "For the consciousness of erstwhile humanity miracle was
based on its having been predicted, not on its deviation from the course of nature
as that had been fixed by naturallaw."30
Rosenzwieg's observations concerning the fate of the miracle under conditions
of modernity seem irrefutable. However, we should perhaps hesitate before draw-
ing the conclusion that the concept of miracle, having lost its semiotic credentials,
has relinquished altogether its hold on the modern imagination. On the contrary,
a more careful scrutiny of the history of this concept reveals it-albeit in its new
guise as deviation from the lawful course of nature-to be intimately linked to the
founding gestures of intellectual modernity. Here a contrasting background may
serve to bring modernity's relationship to the time of the miracle into bolder
relief.
Questions concerning the miracle were relatively foreign to the Greek world
view. Greek natural theology was deeply biased in favour of what, in the existing
order of things, tends toward invariance. Excepting a few Atomist renegades, from
Parmenides to Plotinus the monstrosity, the accident, the exception-and so by
implication the miracle-are less objects of study than of scandal, as much to be
explained away as to be explained. Aristotle's philosophy of nature may serve as a
case in point. Whereas for us the term physics arguably means nothing other than
the rigorous study of contingent events, for Aristotle physics was the discovery of
a necessity that is at once intellectual-it concerns the formal essences and
species-and material-it concerns the binding together of distinct concrete
things within a spatial plenum as well as the combining of distinct events within a
temporal continuum. On Aristotle's thinking the concept of divinity is therefore
at its most epistemologically potent when acting along the channels of this
necessity, through rather than upon the stuff of its creation. 31 If Aristotle places
great emphasis on teleology in both his physics and his metaphysics, it is because
it represents for him the science by which the action of God's Will is identified
with those processes through which the cosmos pursues its own perfection, an
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identification that militates against any promotion of natural anomalies or exceptions
to the status of signs of Divine Providence. Hence, notwithstanding the epistemo-
logical dignity that Aristotle was willing to confer on miracle's affective corollary,
the experience of wonder, there is really no place for miracles in his philosophy-
God, by all means, but not miracles.
If the question of effects that are in abeyance of their causes, special effects as
they are called in the movie business, comes in for much more serious treatment
in the Middle Ages than in antiquity, the ontological groundwork for this treat-
ment was already laid with the criticisms of Greek immanentism that issued from
all three monotheisms. Both the Qur'an and the Torah reserve for God alone the
constancy that Aristotle saw in all natural kinds. In these texts, nature's light is
commanded into being by God's creative word. It is from the perspective of this
theological voluntarism that we must interpret the passage from the Qur'an
(28:88; cf. 55:27) that reads: "All things perish except his Face," and which
glossators rendered as "all things but God are contingent; only He is a Necessary
Being."32 On this account, the species are not eternal, still less the diurnal cycles,
the elevation of the heavens, or the separation of the elements. All these are the ex
nihilo--and therefore, from every naturalist perspective, arbitrary-creations of
an Absolute Will.
The implications of this theological voluntarism really start to reveal them-
selves in the eleventh century, in response to the then recent vogue of employing
logic in theological discussion. Gregory VII's ally, Petrus Damiani, engaged in
vigorous debate over whether God could restore maidenhead post ruinam. A little
later, Maimonides conveys what was more or less party line when he avers that:
"He (God) has the power to change it [nature] completely, or to add or subtract
the one or the other nature from its nature ... but his Wisdom decreed to actualize
every creature as it is actualized ... and not to change its nature."33
By the second half of the thirteenth century, however, these arguments, under
pressure of Scholastic theology's more complete absorption of Aristotelian logic,
were showing signs of strain. A signal event was the set of Condemnations
authored by the Bishop of Paris, Etienne Tempier, in 1277. These concerned the
restrictions on God's Absolute Will and Power that sometimes ensued from the
theological employment of Aristotelian novelties. The Angelic Doctor, Thomas
Aquinas, mindful of the dangers to which Tempier points, followed an already
well-established line of thought in distinguishing between God's Absolute Power
[Potentia Dei Absoluta], which he conceived as being limited only by the law oflog-
ical non-contradiction, and God's Ordinate Power [Potentia Dei Ordinata], meaning
God's power insofar as it consents to being brought into conformity with the laws
of physical mechanism. 34 In coordinating the two, Aquinas gives us a variation on
Maimonides' argument that while God can do anything, His wisdom instructs
Him to sustain His creation in conformity with the laws that have governed hereto-
fore. 35 In the end, Leibniz says much the same Vlrith his principle of sufficient reason.
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What concerned those philosophers who, like Duns Scotus and William of
Ockham, contested Aquinas' conception of the relationship between God's
Absolute and Ordinate Powers, was the implication that God's power could be in
any way inordinate. Scotus argues that the terms "absolute" and "ordinate" signify
not distinct powers, but distinct aspects of a same power. He further argues that
the extension of the former is greater than that of the latter only in those instances
where power is restricted. In the case of absolute power, the extension of both
aspects coincide. Scotus employs a juristic analogy to make his point. In, the mere
subject of an Emperor, should steal a horse, then my act, though possible, is
inordinate. Not so in the case of the Emperor Himself, who a priori cannot be a
horse thief, or indeed any kind of thief, since what belongs to his subjects belongs
to them only by reason of having first belonged, if only virtually, to Him. What is
new in this is less the link between divine and mundane power than the shift from
an organic to a covenantal, and so legalistic, conception of that link. The voluntarist
conception ofboth heavenly and mundane powers that this covenantal interpretation
of the relation between Potentia Absoluta and Potentia Ordinata signals, and which is
only amplified in Ockham's treatment of this same relation, exercises a significant
influence on political theory from the end of the fourteenth century to the end of
the seventeenth. In the twentieth century, it survives in Carl Schmitt's theory of
the role of the exception in the establishment of legal norms, a role that Schmitt
explicitly compares to the role played by the miracle in Christian eschatology. 36
As for Ockham, he follows Scotus in affirming that when applied to God the
terms ordinate and absolute should not be understood as signifying distinct pow-
ers but rather related aspects of a same power. The first question of his famous
"Sixth Quodlibet" begins: "I claim that God is able to do certain things by his
ordained power and certain things by his absolute power. This distinction should
not be understood to mean that in God there are really two powers, one of which
is ordained and the other of which is absolute. For with respect to things outside
himself there is in God a single power, which in every way is God himself."37
However, Ockham pushes further than do either Aquinas or Scotus God's capacity
to act in ways that contradict the laws of physical, if not logical, pOSSibility. If
Scotus acknowledges God's capacity to act in contravention of the communis cursus
naturae, Ockham turns that contravention into a normative state of affairs and with
that gesture evacuates the mediating orders of essences and intelligible species
thanks to which the cognition of singulars was, in Aquinas as in Aristotle, linked
to concrete singulars. With Ockham, therefore, cognition ceases to be an adequation,
via the mediation of sensible and intelligible species, of the intellect to the form
of existing things (adequatio rei ad intellectum). Rather, objects are now seen to
cause in us, efficiently rather than formally, the intuitive notions (notitia intuitiva)
that then serve as terms of propositions. Hence forms are reduced to either qualities
or relations between singulars. God creates only really existing things, with reality
here being determined as irreducibility to any mediating complex offormal relations.
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The litmus test for such irreducibility is according to Ockham a thing's capacity
to exist in the absence of any other really existing thing. From this comes his prin-
ciple of annihilation, which he states in Question Six of his "Sixth Quodlibet" as
follows "every absolute thing that is distinct in place and subject from another
absolute thing can by God's power exist when that other absolute thing is
destroyed."38 This method of isolating a thing through hypothetical destruction of
its intelligible and sensible contexts was necessary to insure the world's contin-
gency, thereby releasing God from any but a voluntary conformity to nature's
laws. The effect of this evacuation of secondary causes was to place a new emphasis
on the exception to the natural course of affairs, with the result that the miracle
becomes the very type of creation. As Blumenberg puts it in his The Legitimacy if
the Modern Age:
Ockham may say explicitly that he asserts only supernaturaliter loquendo [supernaturally
speaking] the pOSSibility of the miracle of the production of ideas without objects, of the
coenitio intuitiva [observational knowledge] of a non-existent object ... but nevertheless
the important thing is not this exceptionalness, without which Christian Scholasticism
Simply could not have got along with its theological presuppositions, but rather the sys-
tematic penetration of such theses and considerations. It is only from this point of view
that it becomes possible to characterize nominalism as the system of breaches of system,
as the shift of interest and accent onto the miracle, the paradigmatic reduction of the
bindingness of nature. It is not the power that can give rise to the world but the power that
can give rise to something other than this world that occupies the speculative interest. 39
The epistemological primacy that Ockham gives to direct intuition of concrete
singular things, and the ensuing collapse of the complex network of secondary
causes, fundamentally alters the conception of God's Absolute Power. The test case
for that power now becomes God's capacity to produce an intuitive cognition in
the absence of any extra mental object that might be thought to have caused it effi-
ciently. This is the problem of the notitia intuitiva de rebus non existentibus that
Ockham introduces in Question Six.40 What is novel here is not the emphasis on
the immediacy of first causes; that is already to be found in Scotus. The novelty
here rather consists in recognizing that this efficiency might forgo not merely the
mediating order of secondary causes, but also the mediacy of concrete singulars, so
as thereby to work directly on the subject's passive intellect. Henceforth God
becomes a Grand Illusionist-the potential author of phantasms and spectral delu-
sions having no correspondence to objects in the world. Ockham places only one
limit on the extension of this capacity to annihilate the world's reliability through
immediate causation of an intuitive cognition. God may replace any other cause;
He cannot replace Himself.
Another nominalist, Jean de Mirecourt, clearly sensed the dangers to both
epistemological and moral autonomy Ockham's notitia intuitiva de rebus non existentibus
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implies. In his commentary on the Sentences, he objects that were God able to
produce in His subject acts of perception resulting in error, He could also cause
this subject to hate not only his neighbour but God Himself. To this Ockham
responds with his own vindication of moral autonomy in the face of the exorbitant
control over human experience he has awarded his voluntarist deity: God can cre-
ate all manner of appearances without corresponding objects. What he cannot do,
alongside replacing Himself, is to compel His subject to takes these appearances
as the basis of actions for which that subject could then be held responsible.
With such considerations we are here very close to the 8enius mali8nus of
Descartes' "Second Meditation," that radically unreliable deity for whom not even
mathematical truths are binding (two plus two may, should God will it, equal
five). What Descartes does, which makes all the difference, is to take Ockham's
limit case for God's capacity to forgo the mediation of those secondary causes that
produce reliability in the world and transform that special case into a normative
state of epistemological affairs. Whereas for Scotus purely intuitive cognition is still
reserved for the l'isio beatifica of angels or of future life, for Descartes, who develops
the voluntarist implications already implicit in Ockham's proto-phenomenological
interpretation of the immediacy of God's power to its effects, intuitive cognition
in the absence of any correlative object in the extended world becomes an every-
day affair. Hence, whereas Ockham's principle of annihilation remains a merely
negative principle, capable of describing what a thing is not, in Descartes it
becomes a method for positive construction, a method whose founding gesture is
the hypothesis of radical doubt that Descartes articulates in his "Second
Meditation" and thanks to which he arrives at the certainty of his cogito. What
opens the way to this constructive transformation of Ockham's negative principle
is a changed conception of what an intuition is. Descartes no longer conceives of
intuitive cognition as owing to the presence of extra-mental things; rather, for
him, intuitive cognition is the immediate apprehension of concepts and images
that are immanent in and spontaneously produced by the structure of cognition
itself. It is well known what a momentous influence this transformation had upon
the epistemological commitments of modernity. Less well known-or, at any
rate, less frequently remembered-is the fact that this transformation involves
generalizing to all of experience that same relation of cause to effect that both
Scotus and Ockham had associated with the miraculous event in their respective
explorations of the limits of God's power.
How have the epistemological developments we have just traced through the
thoughts of Scotus, Ockham, and Descartes influenced the conception of the rela-
tionship between knowledge and experience in twentieth and post-twentieth cen-
tury thought? And to what extent has the event structure associated with the time
of the miracle continued to be conceived as a dimension of that relationship? To be
sure, a place to begin to formulate a response to these questions is phenomenology.
The first significant figure in this philosophical movement, Edmund Husserl,
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explicitly conceives of its founding gesture as a repetItlon of that suspension
[epoche] of worldly relations to which Descartes subjects his coBito in the Second
Meditation. More precisely, what Husserl borrows from Descartes' application of
Ockham's "principle of annihilation" to the res coBitans is the reversal according to
which substance and subject are identified this side of the whole constellation of
relationships that comprise worldliness. Hence, in the first of his Cartesian
Meditations, Husserl remarks: "Following Descartes, we make the great reversal
that, if made in the right manner, leads to transcendental subjectivity; the turn to
the eBo cOBito as the ultimate and apodictically certain basis for judgments, the basis
on which any radical philosophy must be grounded."41
Having established this affinity with the Cartesian legacy, Husserl goes on to
criticize Descartes for not fully undertaking this "reversal," an undertaking that
involves, on Husserl's view, radically distinguishing the transcendental subjectivity
that emerges from this suspension of worldly relations from any association with
empirical individuals, or even, indeed, from the general concept of the psycho-
logical individual:
The Ego, with his ego-life, who necessarily remains for me, by virtue of such epoche, is
not a piece of the world; and if he says, "I exist, e80 c08ito," that no longer signifies, "I, this
man, exist." ... The psychic life that psychology talks about has in fact always been, and
still is, meant as psychic life in the world ... But phenomenological epoche ... inhibits
acceptance of the Objective world as existent, and thereby excludes this world com-
pletely from the field of judgment ... The Objective world, the world that exists for me,
that ahvays has and always will exist for me, the only world that can ever exist for me,
this world, with all its Objects, derives its whole sense and its existential status ... from
me as a Transcendental Ego, the ego who comes to the fore only with the transcenden-
tal-phenomenological epoche42
This version of the epoche, which follows Descartes' in applying "the principle
of annihilation" to the thing that thinks, so as to release it from its worldly relations,
represents the first in the five steps that comprise Husserl's phenomenological
method. The other four are the "reduction" (in which attention is turned back to
the things revealed in the intentional life of consciousness); the "free variation" (in
which attention to the entire spectrum of approaches to the object, actual or
virtual, real or imaginary, reveals the invariant structure of the object); the
"intuition" of the essence corresponding to this invariant structure (as a meaning
immanent to the structure of consciousness); and the "description" (by which
these intuited essences are oriented toward the telos of Absolute Reason).
If Husserl's method of experiential bracketing, reduction, variation, intuition,
and description implies a suspension of the dogmatic commitments associated with
institutionalized religion (since these commitments transgress the intentional
framework that defines transcendental subjectivity), it is nevertheless also the case
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both that Husserllikens the change of perspective ignited by his epoche to a "reli-
gious conversion" and that he identifies the telos toward which this conversion
inclines as God, a God he then understands in Kantian fashion, that is, as the
ontological vanishing point, situated at infinity, toward which the various lines of
intentional consciousness advance: "In myself, passing through the other selves
with whom I find myself tied, all the ways lead to the same pole, God, who transcends
both man and the world."43
At least part of the interest of Husserl's musings on the relationship between
the methodological commitments of phenomenology and religious faith would be
the constitutive role that both give to an intrapsychical Other in guaranteeing the
intentional framework in which human beings operate. It would then be a question
of how, if at all, this role figures in the preservation of that absolute or unrestricted
possibility that becomes the ideal Object for consciousness on the other side of the
bracketing of worldly relations, an exorbitant possibility whose origins we have
already observed in Ockham's proto-phenomenological extension of the evacuation
of secondary causes.
In recent history, at least two thinkers, ]ean-Luc Marion and ]acques Derrida,
have attempted to tease out the theological strands of Husserl's thought so as to
weave them into contemporary philosophical perspectives. In both cases, they settle
on Husserl's treatment of"intuition" as the locus for their respective re-castings of
the phenomenological project. In both cases as well, the problem they settle on is
one which Husserl himself was to take up in his later writings, the problem of the
passive synthesis. interestingly, however, Marion and Derrida arrive at symmetrically
opposed criticisms of Husserl's treatment of this problem. What is important for
present purposes is that these symmetrical criticisms both converge upon that
event structure I have been designating with the term "miracle." In the case of
Marion, this event structure is implicit in the appeal to a "saturated phenomenon,"
one which Marion describes as an effect in abeyance of any natural cause. As for
Derrida, the time of the miracle is implicit in his messianic conception of the
future as the pOSSibility of the impossible, the unforeseen arrival of an eventuality
conceived as something other than merely an empirical modification of the present.
With that in mind, let us examine their respective responses to the Husserlian
legacy in turn.
Marion draws fundamental inspiration not only from Husserl's phenomenology,
but also from its Heideggerian critique. However, like Levinas before him, Marion
is critical of what he describes as the primacy given to the egological perspective
not only in Husserl's account of the Transcendental Ego, but even still in
Heidegger's existential recasting of that Ego as Dasein (and this notwithstanding
Heidegger's avowed ambition to restore the worldliness of the Transcendental Ego
through a reversal of the priority that Husserl follows Descartes in awarding to
cogito over sum in the formula cogito ergo sum). Whereas in Levinas the criticism of
this dimension of phenomenological thinking leads in the direction of an ethics of
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the Other in which the Transcendental Ego's 'I am" is already heard as "Here I am,"
the dative response to an anterior command, in the case of Marion, this criticism
leads in the direction of a renewal of the phenomenological project in which the
epocbe would be applied not to the ego, either as the "I" of knowledge or of experi-
ence, but rather to the phenomenon itself, whose giveness is set free not merely
from any metaphysical teleology of cause and effect, but even indeed from any
consciousness for which it may be thought to appear. Marion's phenomenology of
"giveness" treats phenomena neither as effects to be traced back to initiating causes,
nor as objects of the intentional acts of a Transcendental Ego. Rather phenomena
are for Marion pure effects, in a word-though Marion does not use this word-
miracles: "The temporal privilege of the effect-it alone arises to and in the
present, gives itself-implies that all knowledge begins by the event of the
effect; for without the effect, there would be neither meaning nor necessity to
inquiring after any cause whatsoever."44
Marion refers to this pure giveness of the thing, prior to any subject to or for
whom it would be given, as apparition, a form of manifestation ontologically
more primitive than what appears atomized by the human perceptual apparatus:
What is at issue in phenomenology is no longer exactly what subjectivity apperceives by
one or the other of its perceptive tools, but what apparition-through, despite, indeed
without them-gives of itself and as the thing itself. The distinction between seeing,
listening, and feeling (but also tasting and smelling) become decisive only when perception
is glued to a decidedly subjective determination of its role, as what filters, interprets, and
deforms the appearance of the apparition.45
Taking up a theme that was to emerge most explicitly in Husserl's later work, that
of the passive synthesis, Marion insists that the ego's relationship to this apparition
is, pace both Descartes and Kant, receptive rather than constructive:
In contrast to the Carteisan and Kantian method, the phenomenological method, even
when it constitutes phenomena, is limited to letting them manifest themselves.
Constituting does not equal constructing or synthesizing, but rather gi\~ng-a-meaning,or
more exactly, recognizing the meaning that the phenomenon itself gives from itself and
to itself. Phenomenological method therefore claims to deploy a turn, which goes not
simply from proving to showing, but from showing in the way tl1at an ego makes an object
e\~dent to letting an apparition in an appearance show itself: a method that turns against
itself and consists in this reversal itself-counter-method.46
Like Marion's, Derrida's approach to the problem of passive synthesis in Husserl's
writings concerns the implications of such a synthesis for the claims of auto-
constitution Husserl makes on behalf of the Transcendental Ego. Behind or before
the forms of self-presence this constitution implies, Derrida glimpses an anonymous
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experience whose anteriority to every egological initiative serves to polarize the
constituting and constituted moments whose unity the Transcendental Ego
putatively effects.
Beginning with his M.A. dissertation, The Problem if Genesis in Husserl's
Philosoph)' (1953), Derrida's approach to Husserlian phenomenology was focused
on the difficulties that ensue from this auto-divergence at the origin. In the second
chapter of that work, Derrida offers an exegesis of the account of the Transcendental
Ego's self-constitution to be found in the fourth of Husserl's Cartesian Meditations.
We begin to appreciate how global the stakes of this account are when we con-
sider Husserl's remark that the phenomenology relating to the Transcendental
Ego's self-constitution coincides with "the whole of phenomenology." Derrida's
exegesis of this account begins by posing the question of how Husserl's claims on
behalf of transcendental self-constitution are to be squared with his earlier insistence
on the a priori, and therefore super-personal, status of philosophical knowledge.
Derrida was by no means the first to pose this question. Before him, Martin
Heidegger, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Emmanuel Levinas, Tran Duc Thao, Jean
Cavailles, even Michel Foucault, had each in their different ways questioned
Husserl's articulation of the relationship between transcendental and empirical
aspects of the ego. What distinguishes Derrida from these other readers of Husserl
is the fact that this question is in his case the source not of a break with, but rather
a radical fealty to the transcendental impulse in Husserl's genetic phenomenology.
So radical is this fealty that it prompts Derrida to place in question those moments
when Husserl himself seems to concede to the empirico-existential objections ofhis
critics. Here in this early text, as in the later work, Husserl's account of the gen-
esis of the ideal objects of geometrical science serves as an important locus for
Derrida's attempted clarification and extension of the transcendental impulse in
Husserl's phenomenology. Referring to Husserl's still too empirical derivation of
the geometrical object from pre- or proto-geometrical forms of intuition, Derrida
argues that "the transcendental intentional analysis subsides into a surprising
interpretation the poverty of which holds together in a somewhat derisory fashion
all the inadequacies of a bold hypothesis of explanation, a muddled probablism,"
one whose effect is, on his argument, "to lock us in the domain of a purely empirical
facticity, one that one wished precisely to suspend." But not only does Husserl on
Derrida's account lapse into the very empiricism it is his intention to overcome,
this empiricism is guided by an illegitimately instrumental rationale. For, as
Derrida puts it: "Every detail in this curious account describes a peculiarly
technical genesis."47
In this early work, Derrida's aim in pointing to these technico-empirical
qualifications of Husserl's transcendental claims is not to counter them, be it in
the existential manner of Heidegger or in the dialectical-materialist manner of
Tran DucThao. Nor, at this early stage, is the ambition to deconstruct Husserl, as
it would be in later texts. Here Derrida's ambition is rather to clarify Husserl's
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most powerful insights by subjecting their transcendental ambitions to an operation
of dialectical clarification and correction. Hence his insistence that "every reproach
addressed to Husserlian essentialism in the name of an empirical or existential
originarity or some anterior moment of genesis, in order to have sense, would
imply an already constituted eidetic," an insistence that then authorizes him to
assert that "a dialectical philosophy [represents] the sole possible philosophy of
genesis," since "the sense of genesis is produced by a sense whose genesis is only
accessible in its being, possible in its apparition, if one starts from the originality
of sense." Hence, in Derrida's approach to Husserl (which anticipates his later
approach to Hegel): "All the criticisms addressed to Husserl (those, notably, of
Heidegger and ofTran DucThao, very different from each other, by the way) tend
to a radical reversal which, though this is not seen, presupposes the set of prob-
lems defined and resolved by Husserl."48
Here, already, we can see the signal feature of Derrida's later engagement
with philosophical tradition-the attempt to break radically with this tradition
coincides with a certain hyperbolic fealty to its constitutive gestures, as if, by fol-
lowing the implications of these gestures to the very end, one might cause them
to rebel against their sources. In The Problem ifGenesis, this means taking the claims
of the transcendental to the point where they place in question the metaphysics of
presence that determines both the Transcendental Ego and its Ideal Objects:
The originary and constituting present is thus absolute only in its continuity with a "non-
present" that is at once constituted before it, through it, and in it. The originary synthesis
is precisely one of constituted and constituting, of the present and the non-present, of
oiriginary temporality and objective temporality. The temporality of immanent lived
experience must be the absolute beginning of the appearance of time, but it appears to
itself precisely as absolute beginning thanks to a "retention"; it inaugurates only in tradition;
it creates only because it has a historical heritage. It seems then illegitimate to exclude
right from the start of reflection any temporal; transcendence and any constituted unity
of time. The act of exclusion cannot be pure; it is originally retentional.49
In the study of Husserl that follows The Problem ifGenesis, Introduction to "The Origin
ifGeometry," Derrida takes this question of "an originary and constituting present"
coincident with a "non-present ... constituted before, through, and in it," as a
question of writing, more precisely of arche-writing, of an mnemo-technical
medium older than, always already constituted within, the "originary and constituting
present."This rnnemo-technical medium would represent a tertiary form of memo-
ry insinuated between the primary and secondary forms (retention and recollection
respectively) whose difference on Husserl's account articulates the division between
the living present and the accomplished past, between perception and memory.
Husserl is not unaware of this tertiary memory, which he calls image con-
sciousness (BiIdswusstsein). However, he opposes it to both retention and recollection,
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arguing that it has no role to play in the constitution of temporal objects, neither
in the retentional maintenance of the living present nor in the recollection of
defunct moments in the past stream of consciousness. Now what interests Derrida
about Husserl's "Origin of Geometry" is that it constitutes a lapse in this commit-
ment to separating memory, in both its primary and secondary forms, from
Bildswusstsein. For in this text, Husserl recognizes, however grudgingly and imper-
fectly, the essential role played by a certain kind of image, the graphic trace, in
constituting the transcendence of those idealities that serve as the proper objects
of geometrical science. On this account it is the consignment of sense to an
inanimate trace that allows the retentional finitude of the "protogeometrician" to
be exceeded in the direction of a collective tradition in pursuit of an infmite task
of reason, a task the name of whose terminus is, as was observed above, God. This
is to say that writing, heretofore conceived as an inessential adjunct to sense, is
reconceived as an essential condition for the forms of ideality associated with
geometrical science, and, indeed, for ideality in general.
Before the beginning that says "I," anterior to every egological initiative, sense
will therefore already have emerged from the Ql'che-inscriptional apparatus that
Derrida associates with the term "tradition," a term which he employs to signify
not this or that historically determinate tradition, but the structure of traditionality
in general and as such. Preempting the ego cogito's auto-affecting acts, this apparatus
could be said to resurrect that monstrous offspring of late Scholastic speculation
on God's miraculous powers, the deceiving genius of Descartes' "Second
Meditation"-but with this difference: the subversion of epistemological and
moral autonomy for which this genius represents a limit-case is here attributed to
a de-personalized linguistic field. Clarifying the implications of his concept of
Ql'che-writing for that questioning of epistemological origins implicit in both
Cartesian and Husserlian variations on the sceptical epoche, Derrida remarks:
In connection with the general signification of the epoche, Jean Hyppolite invokes the
possibility of a "subjectless transcendental field," one in which "the conditions of subjectivity
would appear and where the subject would be constituted starting from the transcen-
dental field." Writing, as the place of absolutely ideal objectivities and therefore of
absolute Objectivity, certainly constitutes such a transcendental field. And likewise, to be
sure, transcendental subjectivity can be fully announced and appear on the basis of this
field or its possibility Thus a tTanscendental field is one of the conditions of transcendental
subjectivity. 50
In his later 'writings, Derrida relates this Ql'che-inscriptional interruption of ego-
logical origins not merely to a technical exigency constitutive of transcendence, but
also to a faith or credit commitment to which seizes the speaking subject in a past
earlier than and constitutive of every form of egological commitment. Here the
problem of the passive synthesis, of an intuition earlier than the Transcendental
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Ego's auto-affecting acts, is linked to a "transcendental machine of address" the
immemoriality of whose operation on the subject's mnemo-perceptual faculties
carries an implication that to be is always already to inherit, that is, to be subject to
their faith or credit that binds us to the Other:
Presupposed, at the origin of every address, come from the other at his address, the
wager of some sworn promise cannot not, taking God immediately as witness, have
already so to speak engendered God quasi-mechanically. A priori inevitable, God's ex
machina descent could be seen to put on stage a transcendental machine of address. One
would thus have begun by retrospectively laying down the right of absolute antecedence
of a One who is not yet born. Taking God as witness, even when he is not named <as in
the pledge of the most secular engagement), an oath cannot not produce, invoke or convoke
God as already-there, unengendered and unengenderable.... And absent at its place.
Everything begins with the presence of this absence. The unengendered thus engendered-
this is the empty placeS 1
We have seen that both Marion and Derrida follow Husserl in working through
the implications of Descartes application of Ockham's "principle of annihilation"
to his coBito, with the result that they too are apt to generalize to all of experience
epistemological conditions that Ockham, like Scotus before him, viewed as
germane exclusively to those events where God elects to suspend the communis
cursus naturae. Perhaps WaIter Benjamin is right not merely politically, but episte-
mologically when he remarks that under conditions of modernity the exception is
the rule.
Now in Marion's case this generalization of the exceptional circumstance
results in a qualification of the priority that Husserl gives to the ego in favour of
the "giveness" of a "saturated phenomenon" This phenomenon represents, on
Marion's account, not an object, but an event, one whose incidence entails a reversal
or suspension of the teleological priority of causes over effects. As Marion insists,
viewed from the phenomenological priority awarded to giveness, the teleologi-
cally constituted conditions its constituting origin not retrospectively, but "in the
beginning." For his part, Derrida does not so much contest Marion's insistence on
the singularity of this event as he demands that this insistence be read in tandem
with a countervailing insistence on an iteration that would structure the Singular
ab oriBine. In the absence of the tension produced by this repetition at the origin,
neither the attestation of what has been nor the promise of what is to come would
be possible:
1promise truth and ask the other to believe the other that I am, there where I am the only
one able to bear witness and where the order of proof or of intuition will never be
reducible to or homogeneous with the elementary trust ":!Jduciarite>, the 'good faith'
that is promised or demanded. The latter, to be sure, is never pure of all iterability nor of
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all technics, and hence of all calculability. For it promises its repetition from the very first
instant. It is involved <engage> in every address of the other. From the first instant it is
co-extensive with this other and thus conditions every 'social bond', every questioning,
all knowledge, performativity and every tele-technoscientific performance, including
those of its forms that are most synthetic, artificial, prosthetic, calculable. The act of faith
demanded in bearing witness exceeds, through its structure, all intuition and all proof,
all knowledge. ('I swear that I am telling the truth, not necessarily the "objective truth,"
but the truth of what I believe to be the truth, I am telling you this truth, believe me,
believe what I believe, there, where you will never be able to see nor know the irre-
placeable yet universalizable, exemplary place from which I speak to you; perhaps my
testimony is false, but I am sincere and in good faith, it is not false <as> testimony')
Even the slightest testimony concerning the most plausible, ordinary or everyday thing
cannot do otherwise: it must appeal to faith as would a miracle. The experience of
disenchantment, however indubitable it is, is only one modality of this miraculous
experience, the reactive and passing effect, in each of its historical determinations, of the
testimonially miraculous. That one should be called upon to believe in testimony as in a
miracle or 'extraordinary story'-this is what inscribes itself ,,>jthout hesitation in the
very concept of bearing witness. And one should not be amazed to see examples of
'miracles' invading all the problematics of testimony, whether they are classical or
not, critical or not. Pure attestation, if there is such a thing, pertains to the experience of
faith and of the miracle. Implied in every 'social bond', however ordinary, it also renders
itself indispensable to Science no less than to Philosophy and to Religion. 52
In an era that has witnessed, in the very midst of that post-historical eternity of
Sundays promised by the global extension of capitalist economics and techno-scientific
rationality, a massive recrudescence of religiously sponsored malignity; in an era
in which the time of the other's arrival appears always already absorbed into the
now global extension of a spatial matrix: the grid, the network, the web; in an era
in which "faith" is manufactured through the deployment of media designed for the
precipitation of mass hypnosis and where "credit" has come to signify little more
than a strategy for the unrestricted extension of appetites relating to a second
order animality; in such an era, which has arguably been arriving forever,
Marion's and Derrida's respective meditations on the time of the miracle assume
a measure of interest, perhaps even urgency. At all events, they permit us to suspect-
a suspicion at once delirious and sobering-that the detritus of anthropological
self-assertion that now litters our planet, transforming it from a world into a heap,
that these signs and traces of a collective desire gone awry are nothing but, to recall
Lacan's words once more, "the reverse side of a message that is not even our own."
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